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The task before me is to reflect on a set of interconnected questions. How 
religious and religiously diverse our Western European society is? How 
religiously free are the citizens of these different societies? And what 
kind of impact does secular culture have on religion? How do the different 
religious communities express social responsibility? What is the prospect of 
interreligious dialogue and interreligious cooperation in this context? What 
is the issue in the larger context? What is the social responsibility of a given 
state and society towards religious communities, and, on the other hand, 
what is the social responsibility of religious communities towards the state 
and society in the Western European context? 
Well, I speak to you as a social scientist here, so I will introduce you, a 
little later, to a definition of religion that is widely accepted as such in social 
sciences. I have a non-normative standpoint towards religions, as is common 
in my discipline, and I want to stress here again that available data do not 
allow for exact answers to the questions posed above, but rather suggest 
trends and tendencies.  
I thank the organisers for having invited me to stand in for Marie Claire 
Foblets, coordinator of the RELIGARE Project, some of you are familiar with, 
which was funded by the European Commission and came to conclusion in 
January 2013. The RELIGARE project was hosted by the Law Faculty of the 
Catholic University in Leuven, Belgium, and focused on religious diversity 
and secular models in Europe. Since the beginning of 2012, Professor Foblets 
is also the director of the new Department of Law and Anthropology at the 
Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, in Germany. I have 
been senior researcher of this Institute since October 2006, first as a member 
of the project group Legal Pluralism Working on Religion in Disputes and 
then as a member of the new department with the main responsibility to 
help develop the research strand law and religion. 
Law and religion in fact constitutes one of the three broader thematic 
research areas at the Department. In the view of my responsibility to help 
to develop this research strand, I participated in a couple of international 
events organised by the RELIGARE team, and for this paper I could also 
draw on the draft for the final report, which was presented to the European 
Commission in May 2013. The different international research teams of 
the project analysed relevant legal sources from ten countries, covering 
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Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, 
Spain, Bulgaria and Turkey. The legal analysis concentrated on four areas 
of social life: religion and employment, religion and family life, access of 
religion to public space and different forms of state support to religion. This 
analysis was supported also by sociological research, but all the RELIGARE 
research teams were particularly concerned with two inadequacies in the 
laws dealing with religion: 
(i) Firstly, with the importance that the discussion on the scope of the 
protection on the freedom of religion and belief has assumed in legal 
proceedings in the past few years, not just in Europe but also at UN level. An 
increasing disparity of the modes of legal regulation of religion has become 
apparent throughout Europe, whether in legislative responses or in case 
law. This increasing disparity has undermined legal certainty. 
(ii) Secondly a number of recent court decisions both on the European and on 
the national levels have attested to a tendency to consider freedom of religion 
and belief not as an individual human right but as a group issue. Majority 
religions tend to perceive themselves as cultures and claim protection on 
the basis of reference to a common past and mainstream norms and values. 
Such culturalisation of religion, however, turns a debate on individual 
religious freedom into a debate on the protection of a group culture in which 
individual human rights are subsumed under collective interests. Now this 
goes against the very core of human rights.
The RELIGARE project can help us find answers to the question of how 
religiously free the citizens of Western Europe’s societies are and of what 
kind of impact the secular culture has on religion. However, in order to come 
to grips with the question of how religious and religiously diverse Western 
European societies are, we need to draw on different kinds of research, some 
of which was already presented this afternoon.
I will also draw your attention in that context to Pippa Norris and 
Ronald Inglehart, who – in 2004 – published their discussion and analysis 
of both the European Values Study and the World Value Survey. Their 
point of departure was the following theoretic predicament: “In contrast to 
conventional wisdom in the social sciences which has predicted a progressive 
decline of religiosity in modernizing societies, religion and belief have not 
seen a decline in the modern and post-industrial world, at least not on a 
global scale.” The authors, therefore, set out to update the secularization 
theory, and did so by modifying this theory and grounding it on their 
general observation that, “Societies where people lives are shaped by the 
threat of poverty, disease and premature death remain as religious today 
as centuries earlier. In rich nations, by contrast, the evidence demonstrates 
that secularization has been proceeding since at least the mid-20th century. 
But at the same time fertility rates have fallen sharply. So that in recent 
years population growth have stagnated and the total population is starting 
to shrink. The result of these combined trends is that rich societies are 
becoming more secular but the world as a whole is becoming more religious.” 
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In the second step, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, link this 
observation to what they call ‘the existential security axiom’ which highlights 
the social responsibility aspect of religious communities towards their 
members, I think. The more vulnerable a population is due to poverty and 
all that comes with it, the more religious in the sense of membership in an 
institutionalized religion and participation in its activities it is, regardless 
of what the religion maybe. This axiom bears upon the vexing paradox as 
to why in matters of religion the USA has remained strongly religious, 
although it is rich and so forth. In other words: why Europe – as Grace Davie 
has put it – is such an exceptional case, when we consider a continuous 
disenchantment of the public space in Europe. 
The obvious answer confirming the existential security axiom would of 
course be that social security is much higher in Western Europe than in the 
USA. In other words citizens of Western European welfare states can afford 
to release the familiar ties with the traditional religious, solidarity groups 
of Western European societies that are the Catholic Church, different 
protestant churches and Jewish communities.
Now I also want to revisit with you projects carried out in contemporary 
societies, especially in Western Europe and North America, which state 
that traditional forms of religion, particularly Christianity are giving way 
the holistic spiritualities, in form of new religious movements, as well as 
individualized life spiritualities. A well-known example is the Kendal 
Project by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead that was carried out from 2000 
to 2002, mainly in the old English town of Kendal, in Cumbria, the English 
Lake District. 
My own research on detraditionalisation and new forms of religiosity in 
contemporary Dutch society, which I carried out from 2001 to 2006 at the 
Meertens Institute, a Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences Institute in 
Amsterdam, confirmed all the trends described by Heelas and Woodhead. I 
was furthermore able to draw on the surveys and reports by the Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research, which had been carried out between 1966 
and 2000. These surveys and reports underscore the waning of traditional 
religious authority in the Netherlands, that is to say, the authority of the 
different Protestant denominations and the Catholic church, and the parallel 
emergence of both institutionalized and non-institutionalized alternative 
spiritualities. While this trend has been developing since the beginning of 
20th century, it has accelerated in the Netherlands since the 1960s. 
In terms of my own project, I detected two trends: (1) an increasing 
impact of both collective and individualized alternative – and to a certain 
extent traditional – spirituality on the workplace, and (2), an increasing 
popularity of neo-pagan spirituality and groups, parallel to the emergence of 
the fantasy hype triggered inter alia by the publication of the Harry Potter 
books, the release of the Harry Potter films, The Lord of the Ring movies, 
and so forth. 
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I explored these two tendencies with in-depth field work, investigating 
for instance the activities at a former monastery of the Congregation 
of the Brothers of Our Lady Mother of Mercy, commonly known as the 
‘Fathers of Tilburg’.  At the end of the 1990s, the monastery had turned 
into a spiritual management institution, offering management training 
to state institutions and private clients. The training was provided by 
organisational psychologists as well as management specialists with a 
business administration background. The spiritual background of the 
trainers covered catholic spirituality, Sufism, Zen meditation, landmark and 
other spiritual movements. 
My research at this financially quite successful venture—among its 
clients were several Dutch ministries, a police department, Shell and others—
confirmed the contentions by Heelas and Woodhead that the spiritual 
revolution and the subjective turn had by now already reached traditional 
religious congregations. Moreover, it supported the provocative thesis by 
Jeremy Carrette and Richard King of the ‘silent takeover’ of religion by the 
forces of the market. In their book Selling Spirituality, Carrette and King in 
fact examined the growing commercialization of religion in the form of the 
popular notion of spirituality as found in education, health care, counselling, 
business training, management theory and marketing. 
Lastly, there is more qualitative research on diasporic religious 
communities in Western European societies. The respective literature 
informed by this research tends to flag the conflicts between migrant 
believers and their host societies, which have been caused by the visibility, 
in the public space, of aspects of the migrants’ religiosities perceived as 
extreme or alien by a significant number of members of the host society. 
What immediately comes to mind is the 2004 ban on Muslim head 
scarves and Sikh turban in French schools and the 2009 ban on Minarets 
in Switzerland, the 2010 burqa ban in Belgium and the 2012 ban on 
male circumcision by the District Court of Cologne, which is meanwhile 
superseded by a new bill, passed by the German Supreme Court in 
December 2012, that keeps male circumcision legal. 
Another case in point from Germany is the example of the Hindu 
Tamil Temple that today is located in the industrial outskirts in Hamm in 
Westphalia. For the festival of the Goddess Sri Kamadchi Ampal, taking 
place there annually in June, some 15.000 Tamil Hindus from all over 
Europe visit the temple. In the mid-1990s the temple was still located in 
a residential area. However, the procession accompanying the festival of 
the Goddess, during which the local surroundings were blessed, caused 
such irritation among the locals that the temple had to be temporary closed 
down and to be shifted to its present location in the industrial area with no 
residential atmosphere there.
In comparison to the research highlighting conflicts between diasporic 
religious communities and the host societies, there is a considerable lack of 
knowledge about success stories, that is to say, about cases where there have 
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not only been no conflicts between diasporic religious communities and the 
host societies but where there are even strong indications for harmonious 
relations between the former and the latter. 
If you recall, the Minaret ban in Switzerland came about because it was 
said that minarets are so culturally alien. It is quite surprising then that 
culturally equally alien Buddhist temples do not seem to stir any hostilities 
in Switzerland. Following the futile 1959 revolt against the Chinese 
annexation of their homeland, scores of Tibetans fled their homeland. In 
the early 1960s, Switzerland offered asylum to some 2000 Tibetan refugees 
and also later on to other Buddhists from Sri Lanka and Thailand. The 
Tibetans, especially, found a congenial environment in the Swiss Alps, and 
their religion and culture met with a growing interest from Swiss society 
at large. In 1968, the Monastic Tibet Institute was founded in Rikon near 
Zürich, catering not only to the spiritual needs of Tibetans refugees but also 
to an increasing number of Westerners. A similar case in point is the Thai 
Buddhist Wat Srinagarindravararam in the Swiss village of Gretzenbach, 
which is also very conspicuous from afar because of the huge Pagoda, the 
central building of the temple complex. 
What religion is and not is, is a highly contentious issue from the 
perspective of different religious traditions. Definitions by social scientists 
tend to be broad and inclusive, beyond what theologians tend to expect. In 
the book Religion and Disputes that I co-edited with some colleagues of the 
project group Legal Pluralism at my Institute, and that was published with 
Palgrave Macmillan this year, we defined religion as an analytic category 
that refers to a specific kind of Weltanschauung (world view) that consists, 
firstly, of a more or less explicit sacred cosmological order against which 
all phenomena are interpreted, and, secondly, an escatological order that 
describes how to lead a good life, and what to expect in the afterlife.” This 
definition — and other social scientist have advanced very similar definitions 
— is broad enough to accommodate all the religious developments I have so 
far introduced here.
With respect to the legal regulation of religion in Europe, I want to 
state what should be obvious, namely that law is not only an instrument 
for conflict resolution, it also helps constituting difference by identifying 
sameness and alterity through the stipulation of legitimate qualities, 
powers and constraints of individuals and collectives. Law thereby serves 
as a weapon with which to mobilize or neutralize identities of self and other. 
Identities, including religious identities are, hence, by jurisdiction positioned 
in a particular way in a given socio-political field. This underscores the fact 
that religious identities are by necessity always enmeshed in secular, if not 
to say profane, power plays and concomitant identity positioning and never 
only a matter of subjective choice of belief. 
How then to measure religiosity? Let us first take a look at the statistics we 
have. With regard to religious diversity, we would assume that the numbers 
are contingent on factors like whether a given country had colonies, if so 
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whether the kind of relations retained with the former colonized societies 
are still close or not, whether a given country has accepted asylum-seekers 
in large numbers compared to the size of the autochthonous population, 
whether a given country provides for a large number of labour migrants 
and their spouses and naturalised children, and—to do justice to Norris’ and 
Inglehart’s ‘existential security axiom’—whether the given country still has 
a well-functioning welfare system. It is noteworthy, and quite surprising, 
though, that we do not have any exact numbers. Neither the census in 
Belgium nor those in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Spain include religion. The British census does include religion but only 
since 2001. And we do have some data based on Church Tax collected by the 
state in Germany and in Italy. In Germany we furthermore have REMID 
(Religion Studies Media and Information Service), an NGO in Marburg that 
already since the mid-1990s publishes quite reliable data on membership in 
church organizations.  
The latest statistics date from 2013, which I can present here in a rough 
overview. The German population now counts almost 82 million people; the 
Roman Catholic Church has about 24.5 million members. There are different 
sub-denominations listed under Catholicism. Protestantism has a membership 
of a little more than 23.5 million. There are about 600,000 Orthodox, Oriental 
and Unitarian Christians. Judaism has 101,000 adherents. There are some 4 
million Muslims in Germany, about 45,000 Hindus, and ca. 270,000 Buddhist 
comprising ca. 130,000 German converts and some 140,000 migrant Buddhists. 
Then, there are of course several New Age movements, regular Freemasonry, 
esoteric counselling organisations, yoga associations, and so forth. 
What do these data tell us? They tell us no more and no less, how 
many people value, for whatever reason, membership in a given religious 
or spiritual community. They do not tell us anything about their religious 
beliefs or their religious practice, the basis — most religious people would 
agree — of true religiosity. In order to come to grips with these dimensions of 
religion, social scientists tend to include questions such as: ‘How frequently 
do you attend religious services?’ ‘How frequently do you pray outside of 
religious services?’ ‘How important is religion in your daily life and so 
forth?’ Norris and Inglehart, for example, provide statistics on the trends in 
religious participation. In 1981, 82% of the total population in Ireland was 
still participating in religious service once a week or more often, in 2001 only 
25%. In 1981, still 40% of the total population in Spain was participating in 
religious service once a week or more often, in 2001 only 26%. In 1981, 11% 
of the total population in France was still participating in religious service 
once a week or more often, in 2001 only 8%. In 1981, still 19% of the total 
population in Western Germany was still participating in religious service 
once a week or more often, in 2001 only 16%, etc. 
Participation in religious service must of course be balanced with 
religious prayer or meditation at home, because illness, physical handicaps, 
frailty, and so forth, can prevent people from participating. 
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It is difficult to correlate all the afore-mentioned sociological surveys let 
alone combine them with qualitative data. But let me once again stress here 
the important trends that mark religious life in Western European societies: 
(i) Decline of membership in religious communities; 
(ii) Pervasiveness of the ‘subjective turn’, even among members of religious 
communities; 
(iii) Increase in non-institutionalized, syncretistic, alternative spirituality, 
emergence of new religious movements, parallel to the ‘subjective turn’. 
There is furthermore a growth of cultural curiosity, you could say, for the 
other, and therefore also some interest in conversion, which — along with 
the increasing presence of diasporic religions — has led to an accelerated 
pluralisation of religious or spiritual life orientations. In short, people 
in Western European societies have become less visibly religious while 
subjective spirituality has become more pervasive.
How religiously free are people? In order to get at the degree of religious 
freedom (in the sense of freedom of conscience as well as freedom from 
religion) in Western European societies, we have to take into account the 
RELIGARE report, four models of state-church relations, their mixings 
and their variations. First of all there is the Selective Cooperation model 
involving conditional religious pluralism. Secondly, there is the Konkordat 
(concordate) model applicable to states that have signed an agreement or 
a treaty involving recognition and certain privileges with the churches 
and established religious communities. Thirdly, we have the Laïcité-model 
claiming a strict separation between state and religion. Fourthly, there is the 
State Church model applicable to states with established majority churches. 
But what is at issue in the relationship between the state and the religious 
communities living in its territory? There is first of all the issue of religious 
holidays. If at all, Western European states recognize only Christian 
holidays. Another issue is state support for religious communities in form 
of state salaries for priests, religious teachers, or tax benefits, and so forth. 
A further point of contention between the state and religious communities 
is state recognition of religious marriages and divorces. What immediately 
comes to mind in this respect is the Islamic Talaq where the husband can 
unilaterally divorce his wife by saying three times ‘I divorce you’. 
Another issue, on which we already touched upon, concerns religious 
identity markers at the workplace (the problem of corporate dress, space 
for worship during office hours, etc.). This issue frequently involves 
discrimination against foreign identity markers, which is also the case 
where religious identity markers in the public space are concerned. For 
instance, some German Länder (autonomous regions) prohibit teachers 
to wear “foreign” religious identity markers, like the Islamic veil, but the 
prohibition does not apply to Christian symbols. Another case in point is 
the Lautsi vs. Italy case, which was brought before the European Court of 
Human Rights. In 2011, the ECtHR ruled that the display of crucifixes in the 
classrooms of Italian state schools does not violate the European Convention 
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on Human Rights. Even in Laïcist France, bank holidays usually fall on 
Christian holidays. 
Some major findings by the RELIGARE project involve some surprising 
observations, for instance, that representatives of religious majorities are not 
necessarily staunch defenders of the status quo, or turn a blind eye to what 
they also describe as an unfair situation. Members of religious minorities 
tend to accept their faith and the various limitations they face. They often 
negotiate without invoking legal equality standards. In Denmark, for 
instance, the chief Rabbi sends annual letters to school authorities, in which 
the Jewish holidays are listed together with the request not to schedule 
exams on those days. Secularists do not necessarily reject or downplay what 
they perceive as legitimate needs of religions but want to make sure that 
policies do not leave the non-religious holding the short end of the stick.
Socio-cultural and demographic changes in European societies show 
that the financing of religious and philosophical organizations poses a 
key challenge to constitutional arrangements and legal regulations of 
state support of churches as they had been elaborated in the past. A good 
case in point is again Germany where formal affiliation to the traditional 
churches is dwindling. This trend makes the collection of church tax via 
the state apparatus an embarrassment in terms of legal equality standards. 
In all ten countries investigated by the RELIGARE research teams, the 
state indirectly funds religious communities through tax benefits and tax 
exemptions for their charitable, spiritual, educational, or social activities, 
thereby acknowledging the fact that the religious communities do take 
responsibility for the larger society in different ways. With this I would like 
to conclude my presentation.
